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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND BEACH ACCESS: 
COMPARING NEW JERSEY TO NEARBY STATES 
Jack Potash* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The public trust doctrine, which has its roots in Roman law and 
English common law, establishes that tidal waters and certain other 
navigable waterways, along with the tidal lands underlying those 
waters, are held in trust by the states for the benefit, use, and 
enjoyment of the public.1  Specifically, the public trust doctrine as 
employed by most of the seven states2 surveyed in this Comment 
provides—with some exceptions—that the state owns all lands seaward 
of the mean high tide line in trust for the public, including the 
“foreshore,” which is defined as the area of beach sand situated 
between the mean high and low tide lines.3  Along with its decree of 
public ownership, the doctrine has historically protected the public’s 
right to navigate by boat and to fish upon public trust lands.4  Each 
state’s public trust doctrine differs as to the degree of rights afforded 
to the public; there is a federal public trust doctrine, but it is 
considered “a default minimum standard,” and states “almost always 
expand” upon it.5  As such, this Comment is concerned exclusively with 
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their editing assistance. 
 1  See Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 119 (N.J. 
2005) (explaining the historical development of the public trust doctrine). 
 2  New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and 
Massachusetts. 
 3  See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 359–60 
(Mass. 1979) (explaining that the English common law established public ownership 
seaward from the mean high tide line, but that Massachusetts deviated from this 
standard by using the mean low tide line for public ownership instead).  For a detailed 
discussion of the differences between the states’ individual public trust doctrines, see 
infra Parts II, III & IV. 
 4  See Sheftel v. Lebel, 689 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).  
 5  Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 
4–5 (2007).  
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the public trust doctrines of the seven individual states surveyed 
herein, each of which originated prior to the federal doctrine.6 
In particular, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has advanced a 
dynamic and highly functional version of the public trust doctrine, 
which guarantees that members of the public have both reasonable 
“vertical” access—meaning access through upland areas—to the 
publicly owned foreshore and reasonable “horizontal” access—
meaning access along the waterfront, parallel to the foreshore—to the 
dry sand above the foreshore of Atlantic Ocean-facing beaches.7  The 
New Jersey doctrine applies not only to publicly and quasi-publicly 
owned upland areas, but also to some locations where the sand above 
the foreshore is privately owned.8  New Jersey courts apply several 
factors in order to determine the extent of the public’s right to cross 
and/or use portions of privately owned, oceanfront beaches, balancing 
private rights and public trust rights in the process.9  In addition, the 
New Jersey version of the doctrine explicitly protects the public’s right 
to take part in recreational activities on public trust lands, including 
swimming in the ocean and resting on the shore, recognizing that 
fishing and navigation are no longer the only uses that the doctrine 
contemplates on such lands.10 
New Jersey is unusual, however, among coastal states in the Mid-
Atlantic and Northeast in terms of the degree of access it affords to its 
beaches under the public trust doctrine.  In Maryland, though the state 
owns tidal lands up to the mean high tide line, the public has no right 
to access or cross privately owned upland sand areas in order to reach 
the public foreshore.11  In Delaware, the state only owns tidal lands up 
to the mean low tide line, and the Superior Court of Delaware has 
specifically rejected an invitation to adopt the New Jersey version of the 
doctrine, deeming it to be too expansive and inconsistent with 
Delaware’s existing doctrine.12  New York courts have seen scant 
litigation on the matter and have not established any public rights 
beyond public ownership seaward of the mean high tide line.13  
 
 6  See infra Parts II & III. 
 7  See Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124 (N.J. 
2005). 
 8  See id.   
 9  See id. at 121–22.  
 10  See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54–
55 (N.J. 1972). 
 11  See Clickner v. Magothy River Ass’n, 35 A.3d 464, 473–74 (Md. 2012).  
 12  See Groves v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, No. 92A-10-003, 
1994 WL 89804, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1994).  
 13  See Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), 
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Connecticut’s high court has explicitly rejected the claim that the 
public has any right to cross upland beach areas to reach the foreshore, 
which is publicly owned.14  Rhode Island has a similar doctrine, under 
which the public owns the foreshore below the mean high tide line but 
has no right to access dry sand areas above that line.15  Finally, in 
Massachusetts, private landowners own land down to the mean low tide 
line.16  While Massachusetts’ public trust doctrine allows for public 
usage up to the mean high tide line—covering the entire foreshore—
for fishing, foaling, and navigation, it does not provide for 
“perpendicular” access, which is the same as “vertical” access in New 
Jersey, across upland areas to the foreshore.17 
As a result, the public trust doctrine is severely limited in other 
coastal states in the vicinity of New Jersey.  In these states, the public 
trust doctrine only guarantees public access to a small—and sometimes 
completely submerged, such as during a normal high tide—strip of the 
beach and does not include any right of vertical public access from 
upland areas.18  The purpose of the public trust doctrine—public 
ownership of tidal lands—strongly suggests that the New Jersey model 
is preferable to those of nearby coastal states.  Unlike the public trust 
doctrines of the other states surveyed in this Comment, the New Jersey 
doctrine allows for meaningful, substantial public access to the shore.19 
Part II of this Comment provides significant detail as to both the 
historical development and the modern state of the public trust 
doctrine in New Jersey as it pertains to beach access, outlining the types 
and degrees of access permitted under the current doctrine.  Part III 
of this Comment then provides significant detail as to the historical 
development and modern conditions of the various versions of the 
public trust doctrine espoused by the other six states surveyed herein.  
Part IV of this Comment presents an argument in favor of the more 
robust New Jersey version of the public trust doctrine, as compared to 
the versions utilized by the other six states.  This part considers 
examples from case law to determine how public trust rights function, 
in practice, in New Jersey and in the other six states.  Finally, Part V 
 
modified, 317 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).  
 14  See Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001).  
 15  See Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, No. WC 91-0496, 1997 WL 1098081, at 
*7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 1997). 
 16  See Sheftel v. Lebel, 689 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
 17  See id. 
 18  See supra discussion Part I. 
 19  See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363–64,  (N.J. 
1984) (noting that public ownership of the foreshore “would be meaningless” without 
a means of guaranteeing public access to said foreshore).   
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concludes by reiterating that the New Jersey version of the public trust 
doctrine best fulfills the purposes of the doctrine among the seven 
states surveyed. 
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND BEACH ACCESS IN NEW JERSEY 
The public trust doctrine has a strong foundation in New Jersey, 
extending back to the colonial era.  The doctrine has its earliest origins 
in Roman jurisprudence, which kept access to the shoreline open to 
all persons.20  This principle carried into English common law, finding 
a direct expression in the Magna Carta.21  The modern New Jersey 
public trust doctrine is derived directly from the English common law 
doctrine, which established that the sovereign owned the lands 
covered by tidal waters for the common use of the people.22  The 
existence of the public trust doctrine has never been in doubt in New 
Jersey.23  In fact, the first case to explicitly mention the doctrine was the 
1821 case of Arnold v. Mundy.24  In that case, the court found that the 
sea and the fish therein, among other natural resources, constituted 
common property that the English sovereign had previously held and 
that the state government subsequently held for the people of New 
Jersey after the Revolution.25  The court also noted that the state could 
not convey tidal lands to private holders because doing so would divest 
the people of their common right to that land.26 
New Jersey’s modern public trust doctrine features three seminal 
decisions by the state’s high court—Borough of Neptune City v. Borough 
of Avon-by-the-Sea,27 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,28 and Raleigh 
Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.29—each of which has 
subsequently added to and fortified the rights and protections 
afforded to the public under the doctrine.  The first is Neptune City, a 
1972 decision in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey sought to 
clarify the public trust doctrine after noting that the doctrine, though 
 
 20  Id. at 360.  
 21  Id. at 360–61 (explaining that the Magna Carta “rectified . . . prior improper 
conduct” by William the Conqueror of appropriating common property). 
 22  See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 51 
(N.J. 1972). 
 23  Id. at 52. 
 24  Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821). 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. 
 27  294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972). 
 28  471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
 29  879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005). 
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clearly a part of New Jersey law, was not well-defined.30  The court had 
to determine whether Avon-by-the-Sea, a coastal municipality, could 
charge higher beach access fees to non-residents than to residents.31  
The court noted that Avon had once held its beach “free to all comers,” 
along with the rest of the New Jersey shoreline, but that the rise of 
automobile usage had led to a substantial increase in the number of 
beach-goers, resulting in crowded beaches and the implementation of 
beach access fees by Avon and other municipalities.32  After briefly 
discussing the historical basis of the public trust doctrine and noting 
that the scope of New Jersey’s public trust doctrine was poorly-defined, 
the court proceeded to stress both the vast importance of the shoreline 
to the state and the tremendous increase in the recreational use of the 
shore resulting from improvements in transportation and increases in 
population.33  The court reiterated New Jersey precedent, noting that 
the state owns all tidal lands up to the mean high tide line and 
clarifying that there was no issue of access to the foreshore in this case, 
as Avon publically owned the upland sand area above the foreshore.34  
Thus, the only issue was whether Avon could discriminate between 
residents and non-residents in charging access fees.35 
In a significant step, the Neptune City court resolved the dispute of 
differentiated beach access fees by expanding the rights guaranteed to 
the public under the public trust doctrine in two key ways: first, by 
determining that the public has full access rights under the doctrine 
to publicly owned upland dry sand areas in addition to the publicly 
owned foreshore and, second, by finding that the doctrine protects 
modern recreational beach uses.  Specifically, the court found that the 
public trust doctrine, as a principle of common law, is flexible and 
“should not be considered fixed or static.”36  As such, the court held 
that, when a beach—including “the upland sand area” of the beach 
above the foreshore, to use the court’s own term—is publicly owned, 
 
 30  Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 53 (“It is safe to say, however, that the scope and 
limitations of the doctrine in this state have never been defined with any great degree 
of precision.”).   
 31  Id. at 48–49.   
 32  Id. at 49.  Beach access fees help municipalities pay for beach maintenance and 
operating expenses (such as lifeguards’ wages).  See id.  Municipalities were explicitly 
granted the authority to charge beach access fees in two New Jersey statutes, enacted 
in 1950 and 1955.  Id. at 50.  Avon amended its own ordinance in 1970 to charge higher 
beach access fees to non-residents than to residents, leading to this litigation.  Id. at 
50–51.  
 33  Id. at 53.  
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. at 53–54. 
 36  Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54.   
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“a modern court must take the view that the public trust doctrine 
dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on 
equal terms and without preference.”37  As to what activities the public 
has a right to conduct on publicly owned beaches—including upland 
dry sand areas—the court held that the public trust doctrine protects 
more than just the public’s right to “the ancient prerogatives of 
navigation and fishing.”38  Instead, the court found that a modern, 
dynamic public trust doctrine must also protect modern recreational 
uses, which include “bathing, swimming and other shore activities,” in 
order to be effective.39  According to the court, as a result of such an 
expanded public trust doctrine, towns cannot be permitted to 
discriminate against non-residents in charging beach access fees.40  
Towns can charge fees, but they must charge residents and non-
residents the same amount, as to do otherwise would violate the 
public’s access rights under the doctrine.41 
The second seminal case of New Jersey’s modern public trust 
doctrine is Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, the first major case 
in the state to deal with public access to quasi-publicly owned and 
privately owned upland sand areas above the mean high tide line.42  
Matthews involved the beaches of Bay Head, which contained seventy-
six beachfront properties at the time of the litigation.43  The Bay Head 
Improvement Association (the “Improvement Association”), an agency 
that controlled beach access in the town and limited such access to 
Improvement Association members, directly owned six of those 
properties.44  Private landowners owned the remaining seventy 
properties; however, most of the landowners leased their dry sand 
areas to the Improvement Association, such that it had full reign to 
regulate access to those properties as well.45  As of the date of the 
Matthews decision, there had never been any attempt by the 
Improvement Association or by anyone else to stop any person, 
 
 37  Id. at 54. 
 38  Id.  
 39  Id.  The court noted that other states have similarly expanded the scope of the 
public trust doctrine beyond its original purposes to cover recreational uses, including 
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Oregon, California, and New York.  Id. at 55.  
 40  Id. at 55.   
 41  Id.  (“We are convinced it has to follow that, while municipalities may validly 
charge reasonable fees for the use of their beaches, they may not discriminate in any 
respect between their residents and nonresidents.”).   
 42  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984).  
 43  Id. at 359–60.  
 44  Id. 
 45  Id.  The Improvement Association employed beach police to ensure that only 
members could access the beach.  Id. at 359. 
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Improvement Association member or not, from accessing the area 
below the mean high tide line—the publicly owned foreshore.46  
Specifically at issue was whether the non-Improvement Association 
public had the right to also access the dry sand area of the beach 
upland of the foreshore, for vertical access through it as a direct route 
to the foreshore and/or for horizontal access along it as a more 
expansive right to remain on the upland sand area.47 
The court first found that, in order to accommodate the 
expanded rights of public access to dry sand areas and recreational 
uses that had been established in the Neptune City decision twelve years 
earlier, public access to “municipally-owned dry sand areas,” in 
addition to access to the foreshore, is of vital importance.48  The court 
also noted, however, that neither Neptune City nor any subsequent case 
had addressed the question of access to and across dry sand areas above 
the foreshore of privately owned beaches.49  In a significant step, the 
court determined that the public’s right to use the foreshore “would 
be meaningless” if the public had no way to access said foreshore.50  In 
perhaps an even more significant step, the court proceeded to find 
that the public must be granted at least some access to the dry sand 
areas above the foreshore, not only for purposes of accessing the 
foreshore, but also because the foreshore and the sea itself cannot be 
reasonably enjoyed without at least some ability to rest upon the dry 
sand.51 
After recognizing the practical necessities of public access to dry 
sand areas above the foreshore, the court determined that public 
 
 46  Id. at 359–60.  Access to the Bay Head foreshore could have been gained by non-
Improvement Association members by entering Bay Head along the foreshore from 
the Borough of Mantoloking to the south or from the Borough of Point Pleasant to 
the north.  Id. at 360.   
 47  Id. at 358.  The court described the Improvement Association as a “quasi-public 
body,” and conducted its analysis under the public trust doctrine based on the 
distinction between land controlled by such a body and land controlled directly by a 
municipality, like the land at issue in Neptune City.  Id. 
 48  Matthews, 471 A.2d at 362–63.   
 49  Id. at 363–64.  In particular, the Matthews court noted that such access can be 
divided into two types:  (1) the public’s right to cross dry sand areas to reach the 
foreshore (vertical access), and (2) the public’s right to remain upon dry sand areas 
for sunbathing and recreational activities (horizontal access).  Id.  
 50  Id. at 364.  That said, the court recognized that the public certainly does not 
have an unlimited right to cross privately owned lands in order to reach the foreshore.  
See id.  Instead, “[t]he public interest is satisfied so long as there is reasonable access to 
the sea.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
 51  Id. at 365.  The court noted that, without any ability to access the dry sand area 
above the foreshore, it may be impossible for a person to rest on the shore after 
swimming in the ocean.  Id.   
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rights to dry sand areas under the public trust doctrine should not be 
limited to municipally owned beaches of the type at issue in Neptune 
City.52  Instead, “where use of dry sand is essential or reasonably 
necessary for enjoyment of the ocean, the doctrine warrants the 
public’s use of the upland dry sand area subject to an accommodation 
of the interests of the owner.”53  In so holding, the court cited “the 
increasing demand for our State’s beaches and the dynamic nature of 
the public trust doctrine,” leading it to conclude that the public must 
have a right to both access and use “privately-owned dry sand areas as 
reasonably necessary.”54 
The court identified four factors for determining the exact nature 
and extent of the public’s rights to any individual piece of privately 
owned dry sand area, noting that specific factual circumstances will 
determine how much, if any, access is required; public access to such 
areas under Matthews is, therefore, determined on a case-by-case basis.55  
Specifically, the four Matthews factors are: “[l]ocation of the dry sand 
area in relation to the foreshore, extent and availability of publicly-
owned upland sand area, nature and extent of the public demand, and 
usage of the upland sand land by the owner.”56  In applying its 
reasoning—and the factors it developed—to the facts of this case, the 
Matthews court ultimately found that, by excluding the public from the 
dry sand beaches of Bay Head above the foreshore, the Improvement 
Association frustrated the public’s rights under the doctrine.57  Thus, 
the court determined that the public trust doctrine required 
Improvement Association membership to be open not just to residents 
of Bay Head, but also to the public at large—guaranteeing that 
members of the public could elect to gain both vertical and horizontal 
access to the dry sand areas of Bay Head’s beaches by securing 
membership in the Improvement Association.58 
 
 52  Id.  
 53  Id. 
 54  Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365.  
 55  See id. at 365–66. 
 56  Id. at 365.  
 57  Id. at 368.  Specifically, the court found that Bay Head contained no public 
beaches.  Id.  It also noted that if every municipality on the shore chose to implement 
such a policy, the public would not be able to exercise its right to use and enjoy the 
foreshore at all.  Id.  For a more detailed, factor-by-factor analysis of the court’s 
application of the Matthews factors to a privately owned beach in the more recent 
Raleigh Avenue case, see infra discussion Part II.   
 58 Id. at 368–69.  The court recognized that Improvement Association membership 
confers rights that go beyond the scope of the public trust doctrine, but held that 
opening up membership to the public is still required in order to effectuate the 
doctrine (full membership may go beyond the rights of the doctrine, but no 
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The third and final major New Jersey decision on the public trust 
doctrine and beach access—in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
applied the principles of Neptune City and Matthews directly to a piece 
of privately owned land, in a statement of law that now defines the 
modern New Jersey doctrine—is the 2005 decision of Raleigh Avenue 
Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.59  In Raleigh Avenue, the court 
directly applied the Matthews factors to a privately owned beachfront 
property and found that the public trust doctrine required public 
access to its upland sand areas via both vertical access—from a street 
on dry land, across a dune and dry sand, to the foreshore—and 
horizontal access—along the length of the beach and parallel to the 
ocean, inland from the foreshore.60 
Atlantis Beach Club, Inc. (“Atlantis”) owned a beachfront lot, 
including an area of sand dunes and a large upland sand area landward 
of the mean high tide line, in Lower Township, New Jersey.61  
Specifically, Atlantis was located in a section of Lower Township known 
as Diamond Beach, a small area that contained the only Atlantic 
Ocean-facing beach in the town and had, at the time of the case, only 
a few places from which the public could access the beach.62  Atlantis 
opened its private beach club in 1996, after which it began charging 
non-member residents of Diamond Beach substantial fees for the right 
to limited access to its beach.63  On June 22, 2002, Tony Labrosciano, a 
Raleigh Avenue resident and a member of the Raleigh Avenue Beach 
Association (“the Beach Association”), was issued a trespassing 
summons when he attempted to walk from the wet sand area of the 
beach to the east of the mean high tide line—the foreshore—through 
the dry sand area owned by Atlantis in order to reach his Raleigh 
Avenue home.64  Subsequently, the Beach Association filed a complaint 
against Atlantis, among other defendants, claiming that Atlantis’ beach 
access policy violated the public trust doctrine.65 
 
 
membership falls short of the doctrine’s guaranteed rights).  Id.  
 59  Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).  
 60  See id. at 124. 
 61  Id. at 113–14.  Atlantis operated its property “as a private club.”  Id. at 113.  
 62  Id. at 115.  Atlantis was located at the end of Raleigh Avenue, which was one of 
only three public beach access points in Diamond Beach.  Id.  The closest free beach 
access point to Raleigh Avenue was Dune Drive, nine blocks (approximately one half 
mile) from Raleigh Avenue.  Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. at 116.  Raleigh Avenue residents made up the Raleigh Avenue Beach 
Association.  Id. 
 65  Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 116.   
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The trial court below considered issues of both horizontal and 
vertical access to Atlantis’ dry sand area under the public trust doctrine 
and found that: (1) as to horizontal access, the public was only entitled 
to use the area below the mean high tide line and a three-foot-wide 
strip of dry sand immediately landward of that line; and (2) as to 
vertical access, the public was only entitled to use a narrow pathway 
along the northern edge of the Atlantis property to reach the 
foreshore from Raleigh Avenue.66  The Appellate Division below issued 
an opinion recognizing greater public trust rights than the trial court 
had found, determining that Atlantis could not interfere with the 
public’s right to either vertical or horizontal access to the dry sand area 
under the public trust doctrine.67  At oral argument before the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, Atlantis conceded vertical access to the 
foreshore to the Beach Association along a narrow boardwalk 
extending from Raleigh Avenue to the ocean, but maintained its 
position that horizontal access should be limited to a three-foot-wide 
strip of dry sand immediately above the foreshore.68 
Significantly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reiterated the 
message of the Matthews court that the public trust doctrine would be 
without meaning or force if access to public trust lands, i.e., the 
foreshore, were unavailable.69  In acknowledging this fact, the court 
found a modern parallel to the Roman origins of the public trust 
doctrine.70  Under the ancient doctrine, people were able to haul their 
fishing nets ashore and dry them on the sand, an activity that would 
have required the use of much more than just the usually wet—and 
sometimes completely submerged—foreshore.71  The court then 
 
 66  Id. at 117.  Both the Beach Association and the State, which had been named as 
a defendant, appealed the trial court’s determination.  Id. 
 67  Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 851 A.2d 19, 22, 33 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).  In particular, the Appellate 
Division found that the public trust doctrine included a right of the public to use and 
to remain upon the dry sand area above the foreshore.  Id. at 22.  It also found that 
Atlantis could charge fees to members of the public for use of the dry sand area if they 
remained in that area for extended periods of time, provided that Atlantis supplied 
certain services (trash pickup on the beach, lifeguards, showers, etc.) and that such 
fees were approved by the state Department of Environmental Protection.  Id.  Atlantis 
subsequently petitioned to the Supreme Court of New Jersey for review.  Raleigh Ave., 
879 A.2d at 118. 
 68  Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 119.  Atlantis essentially argued for the solution 
reached by the trial court.  Id.   
 69  Id. at 120.  
 70  See id. 
 71  See id. (“[U]se of the dry sand has long been a correlate to use of the ocean and 
is a component part of the rights associated with the public trust doctrine.”).  The link 
made by the court to the Roman roots of the public trust doctrine is of great 
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turned to the Matthews factors and applied them directly to determine 
the nature and extent of public trust rights, if any, to the dry sand area 
owned by Atlantis. 
As to the first Matthews factor, “[l]ocation of the dry sand area in 
relation to the foreshore,” the court noted that the three-foot strip of 
dry sand immediately landward of the foreshore, to which Atlantis 
wished to restrict the public’s horizontal access, was about 339 feet 
seaward from the dune line in front of Raleigh Avenue.72  As to the 
second factor, “[e]xtent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand 
area,” the court noted that there was no publicly owned beach in Lower 
Township; an adjacent municipality did have public beaches, but the 
only option in Lower Township was to pay for access to privately owned 
beaches.73  As to the third factor, “[n]ature and extent of the public 
demand,” the court found that, while the Diamond Beach section of 
Lower Township was small and had limited parking, the overall 
demand for beach use in New Jersey was tremendous in general.74  
Finally, as to the fourth factor, “[u]sage of the upland sand land by the 
owner,” the court found that, prior to 1996, the Atlantis beach 
property had been open to the public, and that a development 
immediately inland of Atlantis—which had preceded the construction 
of Atlantis—had been required to cede public access to a portion of 
the same beach in order to obtain a development permit.75  
Specifically, the earlier development had to allow public access to a 
220-foot-wide portion of its beach in order to obtain a development 
permit under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act of 1973 (CAFRA).76  
 
significance, as none of the other states surveyed in this Comment have been willing 
to draw such a connection.  The message sent by the Raleigh Avenue court was that just 
as the prevailing public foreshore activity during Roman times (fishing) required 
public usage of the dry sand area, so, too, do modern trust-protected activities.  Thus, 
even if state ownership only extends as high as the mean high tide line, fulfillment of 
the public trust doctrine requires public access to more of the beach than just a narrow 
strip of land.  
 72  Id. at 121.  The horizontal length of the Atlantis tract (along the length of the 
ocean) was about 480 feet.  Id.   
 73  Id. at 121–22.  Specifically, the court noted that Wildwood Crest, the 
municipality immediately to the north of Lower Township, had public beaches, and 
that a private beachfront development adjacent to Atlantis within Lower Township 
allowed public access at a DEP-approved fee (a fee similar to those charged at the 
public beaches of nearby towns, and substantially less than that charged by Atlantis).  
Id. at 122.  Directly to the south of Atlantis was a piece of Coast Guard-owned beach 
property, which was closed to the public for most of the summer season.  Id.  
 74  Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 122.   
 75  Id. at 122–23. 
 76  Id.  The earlier-built development (immediately inland, or west, of Atlantis) had 
owned the Atlantis beach before selling it to the developer who built Atlantis.  Id. 
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In spite of this history of public access to what eventually became the 
Atlantis-owned beach, however, Atlantis closed off its beach to non-
members in 1996.77 
Based upon this application of the Matthews factors, the court held 
that Atlantis must make its upland sand area above the foreshore 
available to the public under the public trust doctrine.78  In so holding, 
the court specifically highlighted the long history of public access to 
this tract of beach prior to 1996, the CAFRA permit granted to the pre-
Atlantis development that previously owned this stretch of beach, the 
high public demand for beaches, the lack of publicly owned beaches 
in Lower Township, and the fact that Atlantis had been using the 
upland sand area as part of its business enterprise.79  The court 
generally adopted the position on beach access fees that the Appellate 
Division had proposed below—that Atlantis could charge the 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)-approved fees to the 
public in order to cover its costs of providing beach services.80 
The three decisions discussed above—Neptune City, Matthews, and 
Raleigh Avenue—form the core of New Jersey’s modern public trust 
doctrine jurisprudence as it relates to the question of beach access.  
These three New Jersey Supreme Court decisions have ensured that 
the public’s rights under the doctrine will be enforced.  The first, 
Neptune City, extended the public’s rights under the doctrine to 
include a right to use the upland dry sand areas of publicly owned 
beaches, announced a right to conduct modern recreational uses 
beyond the traditional protected uses of navigation and fishing, and 
established that municipalities cannot discriminate between residents 
and nonresidents in charging beach access fees.81  The second, 
 
 77  Id. at 122.  
 78  Id. at 124.  The Raleigh Avenue court’s reliance on and extensive discussion of 
the Matthews factors cemented their importance in determining public trust access 
rights to privately owned beachfront properties in New Jersey.  As a result, Raleigh 
Avenue demonstrates that New Jersey courts are serious about enforcing a functional, 
living version of the public trust doctrine, ensuring that it guarantees actual public 
access in practice as opposed to simply in theory.  
 79  Id.  Two of the seven Justices of the court dissented, arguing that: (1) the 
existing public vertical access to the foreshore (via the narrow easement across 
Atlantis-owned dry sand defined by the trial court) and the available access to an 
adjacent privately owned beach (which allowed public access at DEP-approved fees) 
were sufficient to satisfy the needs of the public; and (2) while a three-foot-wide area 
of public upland sand access on Atlantis’ property would be insufficient for horizontal 
access, the proper balance would be to allow public access on a ten-foot-wide area—
not on the entire upland sand area.  Id. at 128–29 (Wallace, J., dissenting).  
 80  Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 124–25. 
 81  See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54–
55 (N.J. 1972). 
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Matthews, built upon the doctrine further by requiring a quasi-publicly 
owned association to provide reasonable public access to both the 
foreshore and to some of its upland sand areas in order to 
accommodate the expanded dry sand rights and recreational use 
rights announced in Neptune City.82  Matthews also established a set of 
factors for the consideration of public trust rights on other quasi-
publicly owned and privately owned beachfront lands.83  The third, 
Raleigh Avenue, applied the Matthews factors directly to a privately 
owned parcel; the court concluded that the public trust doctrine 
required public access both across and within the privately owned dry 
sand area of that parcel.84  These three decisions have solidified public 
trust rights in New Jersey, even in privately owned shoreline areas.  As 
the next section of this Comment will demonstrate, however, nearby 
states do not guarantee the same high level of public trust rights 
protection as New Jersey. 
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND BEACH ACCESS IN NEARBY 
STATES 
This section explores the public trust doctrine as it pertains to 
beach access in six other states geographically close to New Jersey: 
Maryland, Delaware, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and 
Massachusetts.  While the doctrines of these states vary—considerably, 
in some instances—all of them fall far short of the high level of public 
beach access rights provided by the New Jersey doctrine. 
A. Maryland 
The existence of the public trust doctrine has been established in 
Maryland for centuries and, under the doctrine, state ownership of 
tidal lands reaches the mean high tide line.85  Two cases define 
Maryland’s modern public trust doctrine as it pertains to beach access.  
The first is Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, which 
the state’s high court, the Maryland Court of Appeals, decided in 
1975.86  At issue was essentially the same question, albeit in a different 
form, that the Supreme Court of New Jersey answered in Raleigh Avenue 
decades later—what, if any, rights the public had under the public trust 
doctrine to access the dry sand area of a privately owned beach above 
 
 82  See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 358, 365–66 (N.J. 
1984). 
 83  See id. at 366.  
 84  See Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 124.   
 85  Craig, supra note 5, at 64.  
 86  Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630 (Md. 1975). 
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the publicly owned foreshore.87  Specifically, a developer sought to 
build a condominium on the dry sand area of an oceanfront lot; the 
case involved a challenge against the developer’s application on the 
grounds that the condominium would exclude the public from the dry 
sand area.88  The Maryland Court of Appeals noted that “there can be 
little doubt” as to the public’s right to use the foreshore and traced this 
right in Maryland back to the pre-Revolutionary era.89  The court 
quickly qualified this right, however, explaining that the public trust 
doctrine only protects the public’s right to access and use the 
foreshore, and that any claim of right to access or use the dry sand area 
upland of the foreshore “must find support elsewhere”—outside of the 
public trust doctrine.90  Thus, the court established that the public has 
no right under the doctrine to access or use privately owned dry sand 
areas above the foreshore.91  The court brushed away arguments by the 
petitioners, who claimed that they had public trust rights to use the dry 
sand area, as to the history and purpose of the public trust doctrine, 
holding instead that such considerations could not override the private 
landowner’s rights to the dry sand area.92 
The second important Maryland decision to address the public 
trust doctrine in the context of beach access rights is Clickner v. Magothy 
River Ass’n, a 2012 case also decided by the Maryland Court of 
Appeals.93  The case developed after a couple, the Clickners, purchased 
Dobbins Island, a small island in the tidal Magothy River with an 
extensive history of public use.94  After purchasing Dobbins Island, the 
 
 87  See id. at 632.  The court noted that this was an issue of first impression in 
Maryland.  Id.  A significant portion of this case turned on whether the public had 
acquired an implied easement to the dry sand area of the specific piece of private 
property in question.  See id.  This issue was separate from the public trust issue and 
will not be discussed in this Comment.   
 88  Id.  
 89  Id. at 633.  
 90  Id. at 634.  
 91  Id. (explaining that a grant of the dry sand area to a private owner leads to the 
result that the “rights of fishing, boating, hunting, bathing, taking shellfish and 
seaweed and of passing and repassing have been pro tanto extinguished by the prior 
grant” to the private owner).   
 92  Ocean City, 332 A.2d at 637.  Specifically, in a manner that seemed to foreshadow 
similar arguments made (and accepted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey) decades 
later in Raleigh Avenue, the petitioners argued “that fish cannot be salted or dried, or 
cabins or huts constructed, or twigs and branches gathered on the foreshore, which is 
subject to continuous tidal action, therefore placing some of it under water a 
considerable portion of each day.”  See id.  The Maryland court was not convinced, 
holding instead that private ownership rights shall prevail.  Id. 
 93  Clickner v. Magothy River Ass’n, 35 A.3d 464 (Md. 2012). 
 94  See id. at 467–68.  The Magothy River is an extension of Chesapeake Bay.  The 
court’s opinion provides detail as to the storied history of Dobbins Island, which had 
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Clickners placed “No Trespassing” signs around the island and erected 
a fence along its perimeter, just above the mean high tide line.95  The 
Magothy River Association and six individuals (collectively “the River 
Association”) subsequently brought suit against the Clickners, “seeking 
to establish a public right to use” part of the island.96 
The court recognized, and neither party disputed, that the public 
trust doctrine provided that the State of Maryland owned the tidal 
lands of Dobbins Island up to the mean high tide line “for the benefit 
of its citizens.”97  As such, that line marked the delineation between 
public ownership below the mean high tide line and the Clickners’ 
private ownership above that line.98  The court then found that the 
right asserted by the River Association to use the dry sand area on 
Dobbins Island above the mean high tide line—behind the Clickners’ 
new fence—could not be grounded in the public trust doctrine 
because the doctrine does not cover lands above the foreshore.99  
Quoting Ocean City, the court determined that the River Association 
could only use the dry sand area on Dobbins Island if it could show 
that it had either an implied or express easement allowing it to do so; 
the public trust doctrine was of no avail.100 
Thus, Ocean City and Clickner both flatly deny the existence of 
public trust rights above the mean high tide line and strictly limit 
permissible public trust beach access to the foreshore.101  As such, 
Maryland’s public trust doctrine offers far less beach access than New 
Jersey’s doctrine; Maryland’s doctrine, unlike New Jersey’s, offers no 
vertical or horizontal access to public trust lands.  That said, some of 
the states discussed in this Comment, especially Delaware, have an 
even more limited public trust doctrine than Maryland. 
B. Delaware 
An early expression of Delaware’s public trust doctrine, from 
1851, noted the existence of the doctrine in Delaware and announced 
that private landowners owned to the low tide line, but maintained that 
the public does have a right to conduct fishing and navigation on the 
 
been privately owned since prior to the Revolution but had nevertheless been subject 
to frequent visitation by the public during the ensuing centuries.  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. at 466.   
 97  Id. at 473.  
 98  Id. 
 99  Clickner, 35 A.3d at 473–74. 
 100  Id. at 474. 
 101  See infra discussion Part III.A. 
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foreshore.102  The public trust doctrine has not generated much 
litigation in Delaware during recent times, and the only modern case 
pertinent to this discussion is an unpublished trial court decision from 
1994, Groves v. Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Control.103  Because Groves is the only Delaware case on 
the public trust doctrine relevant to the question of public beach 
access, only Groves will be discussed in this Comment. 
In Groves, a private landowner holding waterfront property on 
Rehoboth Bay wanted to place rip-rap along the foreshore of her 
property to prevent erosion.104  In order to gain permission to do so, 
she sought, and was eventually granted, a permit from the state 
Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental 
Control (DNREC).105  The rip-rap was subsequently constructed; it 
“covered an area between the mean high tide, or water, line and the 
mean low tide, or water, line,” such that “[t]he only time any beach was 
exposed was at low tide and then, only a minimal amount was 
exposed.”106  Groves, a neighboring property owner, appealed the 
DNREC’s granting of the permit on public trust grounds, along with 
other, unrelated grounds, when the construction of the rip-rap 
began.107  Specifically, Groves argued that the public trust doctrine 
required public access to the foreshore, which the rip-rap now blocked, 
for purposes of walking, sunbathing, and recreation.108  Groves cited 
Matthews, from the Supreme Court of New Jersey, as persuasive 
authority.109 
The court quickly distinguished Matthews, noting that the New 
Jersey decision does not bind the Delaware courts.110  In particular, the 
court noted that New Jersey law differs considerably from Delaware law 
in the realm of the public trust because the State of New Jersey owns 
the foreshore, whereas the State of Delaware only owns up to the mean 
low tide line; the foreshore is, as a result, owned by private landowners 
in Delaware.111  While the public does have certain rights to use the 
 
 102  Bickel v. Polk, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 325, 325 (Del. Super. Ct. 1851). 
 103  Groves v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, No. 92A-10-003, 1994 
WL 89804 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1994).  
 104  Id. at *1.  
 105  Id. at *1–2.  
 106  Id. at *2.  
 107  Id. at *2, 5.  
 108  Id. at *5.  
 109  Groves, 1994 WL 89804, at *5. 
 110  Id. at *5.  
 111  Id. (“[T]he New Jersey law on this issue is of no value at all.”).  The court’s 
explicit decision not to follow Matthews and the New Jersey doctrine is hardly 
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foreshore in Delaware that are superior to private landowners’ rights—
those of fishing and of navigation by boat, the rights that the court 
stated “constitute the public trust doctrine”—the doctrine has never 
given “a right of the public superior to the landowner to access to the 
foreshore for walking and/or recreational activities.”112  Indeed, the 
court went so far as to determine that, if it or the state legislature were 
to find in the public trust doctrine such a right to walk and/or recreate 
along the foreshore, Delaware would have to compensate private 
waterfront landowners for a taking.113 
Though Groves is an unpublished opinion by a Delaware trial 
court, rather than by the Delaware Supreme Court, there have been 
no contrary statements of law in Delaware in the twenty years since its 
decision.  As a result, Groves appears to be an accurate statement of the 
modern public trust doctrine in Delaware.  The decision establishes 
the extent of the public trust doctrine in Delaware: the State only owns 
from the mean low tide line seaward, and the public’s right to use the 
foreshore is limited to navigation by boat and fishing.114  The Groves 
court specifically declined to follow Matthews, or to even recognize a 
public trust right to walk along the foreshore or to conduct 
recreational activities there.115  Delaware may thus have the most 
limited public trust doctrine of the seven states surveyed in this 
Comment. 
C. New York 
The public trust doctrine of New York was, in similar fashion to 
the doctrines of the other states surveyed herein, derived directly from 
the English common law.116  As in Delaware, New York has scant 
litigation on the public trust doctrine and, as a result, has scant 
litigation on the doctrine as it relates to beach access; in fact, few 
modern cases address the issue even tangentially.  In that respect, both 
New York and Delaware stand in stark contrast to the attention and 
importance given to the public trust doctrine in the beach access 
context in New Jersey.  In spite of the general lack of precedent, 
however, New York clearly has a more expansive public trust doctrine 
than Delaware.  Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, a lower court case decided 
 
surprising, considering the large differences (as noted by the court) between Delaware 
and New Jersey public trust law.   
 112  Id. at *6.  
 113  Id. 
 114  See infra discussion Part III.B. 
 115  Id. 
 116  See Trustees of Brookhaven v. Smith, 80 N.E. 665 (N.Y. 1907). 
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in 1970, is the most recent statement of law on the matter.117 
At issue in Arnold’s Inn was an area of fill that the defendant, a 
private landowner, had placed atop the foreshore adjacent to his 
property in order to elevate that area above the mean high tide line.118  
The plaintiff, a nearby restaurant owner, argued that the fill 
constituted a trespass on public lands by the defendant.119  In deciding 
the case, the court referred to its public trust doctrine via the Roman—
and, later, English—concepts of the jus publicum and jus privatum.120  
The court defined the jus publicum as “the right shared by all to 
navigate upon the waters covering the foreshore at high tide and, at 
low tide, to have access across the foreshore to the waters for fishing, 
bathing or any other lawful purpose,” and the jus privatum as “the right 
of the owner to the foreshore.”121  The court noted that a landowner is 
permitted to fill in the foreshore and, thus, to extinguish the jus 
publicum as to the filled-in piece of foreshore, but nevertheless held 
that the defendant’s fill constituted a trespass against the Town of 
North Hempstead (“the Town”), in which the property was located, 
because “title to the land beyond the high-water line of Manhasset Bay 
is vested in the . . . Town.”122  Thus, regardless of whether the defendant 
could theoretically fill in the foreshore, he was not permitted to do so 
without first receiving a grant from the Town, or, otherwise, without 
satisfying the elements of adverse possession or of prescriptive 
easement.123  There had been no grant of the foreshore by the Town to 
the defendant, and the court found that the defendant had not 
satisfied the elements of adverse possession or prescription, so it 
 
 117  Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), modified, 
317 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). 
 118  Id. at 546.  
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. at 547.   
 121  Id. The jus publicum/jus privatum framework is the public trust doctrine in 
different terms—it has the same impact, regardless of what it is called.  After the Magna 
Carta came into force in England, tidal lands below the high tide line were divided 
into two categories: (1) the jus privatum, representing the king’s ownership interest in 
the land; and (2) the jus publicum, representing that the king held the land as a 
sovereign for the people.  The jus publicum was thus held in public trust.  Boston 
Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Mass. 1979).  After the 
rise of Parliament, the jus publicum was understood to be in the control of the 
Parliament, while the jus privatum remained with the king.  Id.  Because neither had a 
full property interest in the land, neither could convey said land, and so it remained 
open to the public.  Id.  
 122  Id. at 547–49.   
 123  Arnold’s Inn, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 548–49.  The court noted that the foreshore is 
indeed alienable, such that the town could convey it to a private landowner or lose it 
by prescription.  Id. at 548.  
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ordered the defendant to remove the fill placed beyond the original 
mean high-water line.124 
Arnold’s Inn makes clear that public trust ownership—the jus 
publicum, to use the court’s terminology—extends to the mean high 
tide line in New York.125  This case also establishes that fishing and 
navigation are not the only protected public uses of the foreshore 
under the doctrine, because the court also mentions “bathing” and 
“any other lawful purpose” as being protected.126  Additionally, 
although the court did not find a violation of the public trust doctrine 
by the defendant’s placement of fill, it did find that said fill was a 
trespass against title held by the Town in the foreshore.127  Thus, while 
Arnold’s Inn certainly does not approach the scope of the New Jersey 
public trust doctrine, it does establish that the state owns the entire 
foreshore and, more significantly, that the public has a right to access 
it—for purposes beyond just fishing and navigation—when sand is 
exposed there at low tide. 
D. Connecticut 
Connecticut directly inherited the public trust doctrine from the 
English common law after the Revolution, and state ownership has 
always extended to the mean high tide line under its version of the 
doctrine.128  Case law on the doctrine is scarce, but a 2001 decision, 
Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, contains language that directly addresses 
the public trust doctrine as it relates to beach access.129  In Leydon, at 
issue was whether the Town of Greenwich (“Greenwich”) could restrict 
access to a shorefront town park to only its residents and their guests.130  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Connecticut found Greenwich’s 
restriction of access to be unconstitutional under both the federal and 
state constitutions, for reasons wholly unrelated to the public trust 
doctrine.131  The appellate court below, however, had specifically 
 
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. at 547.  
 126  Id. 
 127  Id. at 547–49.  
 128  See Chapman v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38, 40 (Conn. 1831).  
 129  Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552 (Conn. 2001). 
 130  Id. at 557–58.  The park, Greenwich Point, included a beach on Long Island 
Sound.  Id. at 559.  The court noted that access to the park was only possible via a 
“piece of land known as Tod’s Driftway (driftway), which [was] owned by . . . a private 
association of landowners . . . .  The town [held] an easement over a private road on 
the driftway that provide[d] the only means by which a person seeking to enter 
Greenwich Point by land [could] do so.”  Id.   
 131  Id. at 557.  
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discussed the public trust doctrine in deciding against Greenwich,132 so 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut decided to address the doctrine for 
purposes of clarification.133 
The Connecticut Supreme Court first noted that the appellate 
court below had, in fact, conflated the public trust doctrine with 
another area of law, but nevertheless addressed the doctrine in some 
detail in a footnote.134  Specifically, the court explained that the 
Connecticut version of the public trust doctrine includes a public right 
to access the foreshore “from the mean high tide line to the water,” 
but also noted that “it does not also give a member of the public the 
right to gain access to that portion of the beach by crossing the beach 
landward of the mean high tide line.”135  Thus, the court determined 
that the public trust doctrine was of no avail to the plaintiff because 
the doctrine would give the plaintiff no right to reach the foreshore of 
Greenwich Point from upland areas; additionally, even if the plaintiff 
could somehow legally reach the foreshore, his access would only 
include the foreshore itself.136 
As such, Leydon clearly and concretely states that the public trust 
doctrine in Connecticut does not include any right to vertical access to 
the foreshore from upland areas, nor does it include any horizontal 
right to access upland sand areas above the foreshore.137  Leydon places 
Connecticut’s version of the doctrine in the middle of the states 
surveyed: more expansive than the version employed by Delaware, 
because the State of Connecticut has full public ownership of the 
foreshore up to the mean high tide line, but far more limited than that 
of New Jersey, which includes the rights of vertical and horizontal 
access through and to upland sand areas that the Leydon court denied.  
The Connecticut doctrine appears to be more or less identical to the 
Maryland doctrine.138 
 
 
 
 132  Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 750 A.2d 1122, 1126–27 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 777 A.2d 552 (Conn. 2001). 
 133  Leydon, 777 A.2d at 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001).  
 134  Id. 
 135  Id.  
 136  Id. 
 137  See supra discussion Part III.D. 
 138  See supra discussion Part III.A.  As discussed above, Maryland, like Connecticut, 
fully owns the foreshore in trust, but has explicitly denied any public trust right to 
vertical and/or horizontal access to said foreshore. 
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E. Rhode Island 
The Rhode Island public trust doctrine, which derives from the 
common law, extends state ownership up to the mean high tide line.139  
The doctrine is also codified in both Rhode Island’s state 
constitution140 and in a statute.141  In addition to the constitutional and 
statutory provisions outlining the public trust doctrine, there is 
extensive Rhode Island case law—in contrast to some of the other 
states surveyed in this Comment—on the doctrine.  This Comment 
discusses the three most salient examples of this case law below. 
The first important case that can be considered part of Rhode 
Island’s modern public trust doctrine in the beach access realm is 
Jackvony v. Powel, which the Rhode Island Supreme Court decided in 
1941.142  In that case, a commission of the City of Newport sought to 
construct a six-foot-high wire fence across the beach on the border of 
Newport and another town, extending from the mean high tide line 
down to the mean low tide line, in order “[t]o keep nonresidents from 
using the beach for nothing and thus protect Newport taxpayers.”143  
The court struck down the proposed fence as unconstitutional under 
the Rhode Island Constitution, noting that such fences would frustrate 
the public’s rights to “fishing, bathing, boating, getting seaweed or 
sand, or for exercise or any other purpose.”144 
Over forty years later, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
decided State v. Ibbison, an equally important case in the state’s public 
trust doctrine history.145  In Ibbison, the defendants were conducting a 
“beach-clean-up” operation along a Rhode Island beach when a private 
beachfront landowner, accompanied by a police officer, stopped 
 
 139  See Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166, 166 (R.I. 1895).  
 140  One section of the Rhode Island Constitution points to “the rights of the people 
to enjoy and freely exercise the rights of fishery and the privileges of the shore.”  R.I. 
CONST. art. I, § 16.  The following section specifies these privileges as including “fishing 
from the shore, the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea and 
passage along the shore.”  R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.  
 141  A Rhode Island statute implicitly mentions the public trust doctrine; it points 
directly to the constitutional provisions quoted supra note 140, and specifies that the 
State of Rhode Island “has historically maintained title in fee simple to all soil within 
its boundaries that lies below the high water mark.”  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-5-1.2 (West 
2014).   
 142  Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554 (R.I. 1941).  
 143  Id. at 554–55 (quotation marks omitted).   
 144  Id. at 558.  The constitutional provision that the court held to be offended was 
article I, section 17, which is essentially a constitutional codification of the public trust 
doctrine.  See supra note 140.  
 145  State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982).  
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them.146  The defendants were subsequently convicted of criminal 
trespass.147  At the time of their arrests, the defendants were located 
landward of the mean high tide line, but seaward of the high water 
mark, defined by the defendants at the trial court as “a visible line on 
the shore indicated by the reach of an average high tide and further 
indicated by drifts and seaweed along the shore.”148  The direct issue 
before the court was how to calculate the boundary line of public trust 
ownership to determine whether a trespass occurred.149 
After reviewing Rhode Island precedent and the common law 
public trust doctrine, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined 
that the state constitution’s guarantees of public rights extend to the 
mean high tide line—not to the high water mark, which is above the 
mean high tide line during periods of higher-than-normal tides (as was 
the case when the defendants were on the beach).150  The court found 
that setting the demarcation line dividing public and private 
ownership at the mean high tide line, instead of the high water mark, 
struck the best balance between the interests of the public and the 
beachfront landowners.151  Setting the line above the mean high tide 
line at the high water mark, according to the court, would deprive 
private landowners of their rights, and setting the demarcation line 
below the mean high tide line would deprive the public of its rights.152  
Nevertheless, the court, noting the confusion of previous Rhode Island 
decisions in determining the exact line of the extent of public 
ownership, affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the trespassing 
charges against the defendants.153  Additionally, the court held that 
municipalities pursuing such trespassing charges against members of 
the public in the future must be able to prove that the would-be 
trespassers knew that they were located above—and had intentionally 
 
 146  Id. at 729.  
 147  Id.  
 148  Id.  It is worth noting that, at the time of the defendant’s arrest, the mean high 
tide line was under water.  Id. at 729–30.   
 149  Id. at 730.  
 150  See id. at 732.  
 151  Ibbison, 448 A.2d at 732. 
 152  Id. (“Setting the boundary at the point where spring tides reach would unfairly 
take from littoral owners land that is dry for most of the month.  Similarly, setting 
[it] . . . at the [] mean low tide [line] would so restrict the size of the shore as to render 
it practically nonexistent.”).   
 153  Id. at 733 (“In view of the lack of clarity in early decisions of this court regarding 
whether the landward boundary of the shoreline was to be computed as a mean or as 
an absolute high-water mark, we shall affirm the dismissals of the charges . . . but for 
different reasons.”). 
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crossed—the mean high tide line.154 
A third—and perhaps even more relevant, for purposes of this 
Comment—Rhode Island case dealing with the public trust doctrine 
and beach access is Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, an unpublished 
1997 trial court decision that offers a clear statement of current Rhode 
Island law on the matter.155  In Cavanaugh, the plaintiff was charged 
with a misdemeanor after he attempted, without paying the beach 
access fee, to cross the dry sand area of a public beach in order to reach 
the foreshore below the dry sand area.156  Abutting the public beach 
were private properties and structures that completely blocked the 
public from having any “perpendicular” access to the foreshore—
equivalent to what New Jersey courts call “vertical” access, and which 
will be referred to as “vertical” access subsequently in this Comment—
such that only the publicly owned, fee-charging beach afforded the 
general public any vertical access to said foreshore.157  The plaintiff 
sued, arguing that the Town of Narragansett could not deprive the 
public of vertical access to an otherwise inaccessible area of foreshore 
by charging fees.158 
The court interpreted article I, section 17 of the Rhode Island 
Constitution to determine whether the public trust doctrine required 
vertical access to the foreshore; it found that “the provision by its own 
language provides absolutely no indication that a right of [vertical] 
access across the property of others exists.”159  According to the court, 
even if the public trust doctrine did provide for vertical access to the 
foreshore, the Town of Narragansett would still be able to charge the 
beach access fees that it did in this case.160  Additionally, the court 
found no support for the plaintiff’s argument that the public trust 
doctrine implicates the dry sand area above the mean high tide line.161 
Taking Jackvony, Ibbison, and Cavanaugh together, Rhode Island’s 
public trust doctrine presents a mixture of both expansive and limited 
rights in the realm of beach access.162  On one hand, two articles of the 
 
 154  Id. 
 155  Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, No. WC91-0496, 1997 WL 1098081 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 1997).  
 156  Id. at *2.   
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. at *5.  In tracing the history of the common law public trust doctrine and 
applying that history to article I, section 17, the court found a lack of any right to 
vertical access.  Id. at *9.  
 160  Id. at *11.  
 161  Cavanaugh, 1997 WL 1098081, at *7.  
 162  See supra discussion Part III.E. 
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state constitution and a state statute have codified the public trust 
doctrine in Rhode Island and provide, in sum, that the doctrine goes 
beyond fishing and navigation to include a right of “passage along the 
shore” and other recreational activities that are not protected in some 
of the other states surveyed in this Comment.163  Jackvony affirms these 
rights as indeed part of the doctrine and establishes that fences cannot 
be erected that block off the foreshore and prevent the public from 
passing along it.164  On the other hand, Cavanaugh illustrates that there 
is simply no public right to vertical access to the foreshore, setting the 
Rhode Island doctrine apart from the New Jersey doctrine in that 
manner.165  Additionally, Ibbison implicitly shows that Rhode Island 
does not recognize a public trust right to use any of the dry sand area 
landward of the mean high tide line, because anyone who does so 
intentionally risks being convicted of trespass.166  Thus, Rhode Island’s 
public trust doctrine provides the public with substantial rights in the 
foreshore itself, but provides no vertical access through or horizontal 
access to upland dry sand areas. 
F. Massachusetts 
Like the other states surveyed in this Comment, Massachusetts 
inherited its public trust doctrine directly from the English common 
law.167  Unlike most of the other states, however, Massachusetts broke 
away from the English model when it determined that the seaward 
extent of private property ownership was the low tide line instead of 
the high tide line.168  This change in the law, which pre-dated the 
Revolution by more than a century, was an accommodation for the 
building of wharves by private landowners along the shoreline.169  The 
Massachusetts courts later placed one important condition on the 
expanded ownership rights of private landowners to the low tide line: 
landowners cannot impede the navigation of boats.170  Massachusetts 
has rich case law on the public trust doctrine, but two cases, in 
particular, best outline Massachusetts’ modern doctrine in the context 
of beach access. 
 
 163  See supra notes 140 & 141. 
 164  See Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554, 558 (R.I. 1941). 
 165  See Cavanaugh, 1997 WL 1098081, at *5.  
 166  See State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 733 (R.I. 1982). 
 167  Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358–59 
(Mass. 1979).   
 168  Id. at 359–60.  
 169  Id.  The change to private ownership down to the low tide line can be traced in 
official capacity as far back as the colonial ordinance of 1647.  Id. at 360.  
 170  Id. at 360–61.  
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The first salient case on the matter, Opinion of the Justices, is actually 
an answer by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the State’s 
highest court, submitted in response to a question posed by the 
Massachusetts House of Representatives about a proposed bill.171  The 
proposed bill sought to codify a public right to “on-foot free right-of-
passage” through the area “between the mean high water line and the 
extreme low water line.”172  The court noted that the public has 
“limited” rights to use the shore.173  As an example of the limited nature 
of these rights, the court cited the contrary right of a waterfront 
landowner to build on his property to the extent that the public is 
completely excluded from it, as long as he does not block the 
navigation of boats.174  Thus, the court held that there was no authority 
whatsoever to grant the public “a right to walk on the beach.”175  
According to the court, the proposed bill would actually have gone so 
far as to constitute a public taking under the Massachusetts 
Constitution, necessitating the payment of compensation to 
beachfront landowners.176  The court also explicitly declined to 
endorse the more expansive version of public trust doctrine rights that 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey espoused only two years prior in 
Neptune City.177 
The second important Massachusetts case is Sheftel v. Lebel, a 1998 
intermediate appellate court decision that squarely addressed the 
question of vertical access to the foreshore.178  At issue in Sheftel was an 
easement held by the defendants across the plaintiffs’ property to a 
tidal body of water.179  The defendants argued that the easement should 
be extended from its ending point at the mean high tide line down to 
the mean low water line, and sought to build a pier for their boat out 
 
 171  Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974). 
 172  Id. at 563–65.  
 173  Id. at 566. 
 174  Id. (“[A] littoral owner may build on his tidal land so as to exclude the public 
completely as long as he does not unreasonably interfere with navigation.”). 
 175  Id. at 566–67. 
 176  Id. at 568.  For an example of another state court similarly determining that 
granting such a right would constitute a taking, see Groves v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Natural 
Res. & Envtl. Control, No. 92A-10-003, 1994 WL 89804, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 
1994) (finding that a public right to walk along the shoreline would constitute a taking 
and result in necessary compensation payments to beachfront landowners).  
 177  Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E. 2d at 567 (“Whatever may be the propriety of 
such an interpretation  . . . the grant to private parties effected by the colonial 
ordinance [of 1647] has never been interpreted to provide the littoral owners only 
such uncertain and ephemeral rights . . . .  The rights of the public though strictly 
protected have also been strictly confined . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).   
 178  Sheftel v. Lebel, 689 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
 179  Id. at 501. 
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to that line, while the plaintiffs argued that the easement should not 
be extended beyond the mean high tide line.180  While the other facts 
of the case are not particularly relevant to this Comment, the court’s 
discussion of the public trust doctrine, analyzed below, is indeed very 
salient. 
At the outset, the court noted that private landowners in 
Massachusetts own property down to the low tide line, in contrast to 
the typical common law rule—followed in most other states—granting 
private ownership only to the high tide line.181  The court also noted, 
significantly, that the foreshore has nevertheless always been subject to 
the public trust doctrine, which establishes that the public holds a 
reserved easement to use the foreshore for “fishing, fowling, and 
navigation.”182  The court subsequently qualified its statement by also 
determining that the public has no right to “perpendicular” (vertical) 
access under the public trust doctrine through privately owned upland 
property to reach the foreshore, noting that anyone who crosses such 
property to access the foreshore is guilty of trespass.183  Easements, such 
as the one that existed in this case, are therefore necessary for any 
member of the public to have lawful access across another’s privately 
owned upland sand area to the foreshore below.184 
The Sheftel court explained the Massachusetts public trust 
doctrine in a very precise manner: private landowners own the land to 
the low water line, the public has an easement to use the foreshore for 
a few specific purposes, and there is no right to vertical access to the 
foreshore from upland areas.185  Opinion of the Justices is also chiefly 
important as an exposition of the public trust doctrine in 
Massachusetts, as it clearly declares that the doctrine contains no 
public right to walk along the beach.186  Taken together, Opinion of the 
Justices and Sheftel illustrate that Massachusetts clearly falls on the more 
 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. at 503.  
 182  Id. at 505.  
 183  Id. (“The public has, however, no right of perpendicular access across private 
upland property, i.e., no right to cross, without permission, the dry land of another for 
the purpose of gaining access to the water or the flats in order to exercise public trust 
rights; doing so constitutes a trespass.”).   
 184  See Sheftel, 689 N.E.2d at 505.  The court noted that the easement’s purpose was 
to allow access to the foreshore and that no extension of that easement to the low 
water line was necessary for the defendants because the public trust doctrine protects 
the public’s right of boating on the foreshore.  Id.  Therefore, an easement extending 
as far as the mean high tide line sufficed to give the defendants access to the water for 
boating.  Id.  
 185  See id. at 503–05. 
 186  See Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Mass. 1974).  
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limited end of the spectrum in terms of the scope of rights it grants 
under its public trust doctrine.  In particular, Delaware is the only 
other state in which private ownership extends to the mean low tide 
line, and there is no right to vertical access to the foreshore or 
horizontal access to the dry sand area above the foreshore in 
Massachusetts.  Thus, public trust rights in Massachusetts are limited 
to a reserved public easement to conduct the traditional trust-
protected activities of fishing, fowling, and navigation in the privately 
owned foreshore, and do not include any guarantee of vertical access. 
IV. OF THE STATES SURVEYED, NEW JERSEY BEST IMPLEMENTS THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
New Jersey has the most expansive version of the public trust 
doctrine of the states surveyed in this Comment with regard to beach 
access.  Its recognition of public trust rights of both vertical access 
(across upland sand areas to the publicly owned foreshore) and 
horizontal access (parallel to the ocean along the length of the beach 
and encompassing dry sand areas above the foreshore) guarantees that 
the public trust doctrine is far more than a legal theory; it allows for 
real access to, and true enjoyment of, public trust lands.187  In contrast, 
the doctrines of the other six states contain no rights of vertical access 
through, or horizontal access to, dry sand areas; thus, public trust 
rights in these states often exist in theory only and may be of little use 
in practice.188 
First, without the key right of vertical access that New Jersey courts 
have found, the public trust doctrine is largely without force, because 
without vertical access, members of the public may have no means 
whatsoever by which to physically reach public trust lands.189  As will be 
reiterated below, none of the other six states provide for any degree of 
vertical access within their respective versions of the public trust 
doctrine; thus, access to the foreshore may be impossible in portions 
of these states. 
In Maryland, though the applicable case law does not explicitly 
refer to vertical access, the two cases reviewed in this Comment clearly 
 
 187  See, e.g., Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 
121, 124 (N.J. 2005). 
 188  See, e.g., Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 634 (Md. 
1975).  This is but one example of the numerous statements of law rendered by courts 
outside of New Jersey, discussed in this Comment, denying the public of vertical access 
rights to the foreshore through upland areas.  
 189  See, e.g., Sheftel, 689 N.E.2d at 505 (noting that, in Massachusetts, an easement is 
required for the public to cross privately owned upland sand areas in order to reach 
the public trust-protected foreshore).   
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establish that the public has no right to such access.190  The Ocean City 
court plainly held that the public trust doctrine only confers a right to 
use the foreshore itself; in fact, it specifically denied that the doctrine 
lends any support to the notion that the public has a right to cross 
upland areas in order to reach the foreshore.191  The Clickner court 
affirmed this narrow doctrine when it held that the public cannot 
access privately owned dry sand areas without an easement.192  The 
collective force of Ocean City and Clickner establishes that the public 
trust doctrine in Maryland only protects the public’s limited right in 
the foreshore itself, without any corresponding protection of the 
public’s ability to physically reach the foreshore.  As a result, the public 
may not have any way to actually access the otherwise publicly owned 
Maryland foreshore in spite of its purportedly guaranteed right to said 
foreshore. 
Delaware, too, has implicitly rejected any notion of vertical access 
to public trust lands.  In Groves, a Delaware trial court refused to follow 
New Jersey’s Matthews decision.193  While the Groves opinion did not 
directly address vertical access, its rejection of Matthews and its finding 
of very limited public rights, encompassing only fishing and navigation 
in Delaware’s privately owned foreshore, indicate that the idea of 
vertical access in Delaware is rather far-fetched.194  In fact, Delaware’s 
public trust doctrine is so limited that even if Delaware recognized a 
public right of vertical access to the foreshore, it would not constitute 
a significant public right because the Groves court held that the 
doctrine includes no right in the public to even walk along or conduct 
recreational activities within the foreshore, apart from the limited 
allowance of fishing and boating.195 
New York courts have affirmed public ownership of the foreshore, 
as the court established in Arnold’s Inn.196  That said, no case in New 
York has addressed the question of whether a right of vertical access 
actually exists.  Without any statement of case law or statutory authority 
establishing such a right, there is no indication that the public would 
be able to cross privately owned upland areas to reach the foreshore in 
New York without committing trespass, because vertical access is the 
 
 190  See supra discussion Part III.A. 
 191  See Ocean City, 332 A.2d at 634. 
 192  See Clickner v. Magothy River Ass’n, 35 A.3d 464, 473–74 (Md. 2012). 
 193  See Groves v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, No. 92A-10-003, 
1994 WL 89804, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1994). 
 194  See id. at *5–6.  
 195  See id. at *6.  
 196  See Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), 
modified, 317 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). 
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rare exception, rather than the rule, among the states surveyed. 
Connecticut has provided a statement of law clear enough to 
prevent any misinterpretation on the question of whether a right to 
vertical access to the foreshore exists in the state—there is no such 
right.197  The Leydon court clearly established two principles in its brief 
discussion of the public trust doctrine: (1) the public has a right to 
access the foreshore, but (2) the public has no right to reach said 
foreshore by crossing upland areas.198  As a result, Connecticut’s 
doctrine is typical of the surveyed states: it has a publicly owned 
foreshore, which the public theoretically has the right to access, but 
the public has no right to vertically access that foreshore, leading to 
the potential scenario—as would have been the case in Leydon had the 
court not struck down the Town of Greenwich’s restriction on access 
for constitutional reasons—of a publicly owned foreshore that is 
physically impossible for the public to actually access, except, perhaps, 
by boat.199  As such, Leydon is highly illustrative of the shortcomings of 
a public trust doctrine without a right to vertical access. 
Rhode Island, too, has explicitly denied that its public trust 
doctrine—which is enshrined in its constitution and in statute—
includes a right to vertical access, as explained by the court in 
Cavanaugh.200  Cavanaugh, like Leydon, dealt with vertical access to the 
foreshore through publicly owned property; in Cavanaugh, however, 
access was not restricted to a particular group, but was instead 
regulated by a beach access fee.201  The court noted, as the New Jersey 
courts have, that a municipality can charge a beach access fee without 
interfering with public trust rights.202  The Cavanaugh court also denied 
the existence of a right to vertical access to the foreshore, as noted 
above.203  Significantly, the public beach in Cavanaugh was surrounded 
 
 197  See Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001). 
 198  See id. 
 199  See id. at 564 n.17, 565–66.  The court noted that the public trust doctrine was 
of no avail to the plaintiff, who had no right to access the publicly owned foreshore of 
a publicly owned park under the public trust doctrine.  See id. at 559, 564 n.17.  Thus, if 
not for the unrelated federal and state constitutional violations by the Town of 
Greenwich, upon which grounds the court invalidated the Greenwich ordinance, the 
plaintiff would have had no actual means by which to access this particular piece of 
the foreshore.  See id. at 565–75. 
 200  See Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, No. WC91-0496, 1997 WL 1098081, at 
*5 (R.I. Super. Oct. 10, 1997).  The court interpreted the Rhode Island Constitution 
narrowly, refusing to find a right to vertical access where one was not explicitly stated.  
See id.  Although Cavanaugh was not a decision of the state’s highest court, there has 
been no contrary statement of law in Rhode Island since its decision in 1997.   
 201  See id. at *2.  
 202  See id. at *11.  
 203  See id. at *5.  
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by privately owned parcels and beach structures that rendered the 
foreshore entirely inaccessible to the public, save for the public beach 
in question.204  It would not take a very different set of facts to render 
the foreshore entirely inaccessible; had that public beach instead been 
private, the Rhode Island doctrine still would not allow for any vertical 
access to the foreshore, such that the foreshore would be entirely 
inaccessible to the public that owns it. 
Finally, Massachusetts’ public trust doctrine includes a similarly 
specific denial of a right to vertical access, leading to the same 
undesirable result of a foreshore that is potentially inaccessible to the 
public that is intended to have a right to use it under the doctrine.  The 
Sheftel court explicitly stated that there is no right to vertical access 
across upland areas to reach the foreshore; attempting to cross a 
privately owned upland area to reach the foreshore constitutes a 
trespass, unless the person seeking to cross the upland area has an 
easement to do so, as the plaintiff in Sheftel indeed did.205  As in the 
other states surveyed herein apart from New Jersey, Massachusetts’ 
public trust doctrine contains no means by which the public can 
actually access the foreshore in which the doctrine establishes that it 
has specific rights. 
With the lack of vertical access to public trust lands that exists in 
the six states other than New Jersey, there is no guarantee that the 
public will have any way to reach the foreshore on foot without 
committing trespass.  The Matthews court said it best: “[w]ithout some 
means of access[,] the public right to use the foreshore would be 
meaningless.”206  Refusing to recognize any right to access the 
foreshore would—to quote the Matthews court again—“seriously 
impinge on, if not effectively eliminate, the rights of the public trust 
doctrine.”207  Simply put, if the public cannot actually reach the 
foreshore, public ownership of it is futile.  And the importance of 
vertical access goes beyond public policy.  As the Matthews court 
demonstrated in the quoted material above, the very functionality of 
the public trust doctrine depends on the presence of at least some 
degree of vertical access.  In lieu of vertical access points, tracts of 
private beachfront land can render the valuable foreshore entirely 
inaccessible to the public, so that it serves no purpose to those who 
purportedly hold it in trust.  The significance of the public trust 
doctrine thus depends on the existence of at least some degree of 
 
 204  See id. 
 205  See Sheftel v. Lebel, 689 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
 206  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984).   
 207  Id.   
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vertical access to the foreshore.  Without such access, the public trust 
doctrine is without force. 
Second, without a right to horizontal access to at least some 
portion of the upland dry sand area above the foreshore, the 
usefulness of the public trust doctrine in the other six states is further 
limited.  Questions of horizontal access are closely tied to questions of 
vertical access, as both implicate the upland dry sand area above the 
foreshore.  Thus, unsurprisingly, states that have denied a right to 
vertical access have similarly denied a right to horizontal access—albeit 
implicitly, since New Jersey is the only state to refer to “horizontal 
access” as a separate concept.  For example, the Ocean City court 
rejected the petitioners’ arguments to the effect that at least some 
usage of the dry sand area is necessary in order to enjoy the foreshore, 
holding instead that the rights of private landowners who own such dry 
sand areas trump any claim of right by the public.208  Similarly, the 
Clickner court found that the public trust doctrine technically does not 
cover the dry sand area above the mean high tide line and, thus, it 
found no public right to use it.209  The Leydon court dealt directly with 
vertical access, but implicated horizontal access as well by finding that 
public trust access rights only include the foreshore itself.210  The 
Ibbison court also implicitly denied any right to horizontal access, 
finding that a person who knowingly and intentionally walks on a 
privately owned dry sand area above the mean high tide line commits 
trespass.211  Indeed, none of the non-New Jersey states have found any 
form of public right of horizontal access to the dry sand area above the 
foreshore. 
The right to horizontal access is nearly as important as the right 
to vertical access.  Namely, by definition, the foreshore is completely 
submerged at least once during the average day because seawater 
reaches beyond the mean high tide line during the higher of the two 
daily high tides.  Additionally, during weather-related episodes of 
higher-than-normal tides, the foreshore is submerged for extended 
periods of time.  As the Matthews court noted, the foreshore and the 
ocean cannot be reasonably enjoyed “unless some enjoyment of the 
 
 208  See Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 637 (Md. 1975).  
The court very specifically limited the public’s rights to the foreshore itself, finding 
that the public trust doctrine only protects that narrow area and does not confer any 
public right to use dry sand area above the foreshore.  Id. at 634.  
 209  See Clickner v. Magothy River Ass’n, 35 A.3d 464, 473–74 (Md. 2012).  As in 
Ocean City and Sheftel, the court held that the dry sand area could only be used if an 
easement to use it existed.  See id. at 474. 
 210  See Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001). 
 211  See State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 733 (R.I. 1982).  
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dry sand area is also allowed.”212  Without any place for people to rest 
and relax after swimming in the ocean, for example—and the dry sand 
area may be the only place where a swimmer can physically rest and 
relax without being subjected to ocean waves—it may be impossible for 
the public to use the ocean for swimming.213  Clearly, while the other 
six states surveyed apart from New Jersey do not recognize a right to 
horizontal access, they all protect the public’s right to use the ocean, 
considering the fact that the public trust doctrine covers all lands 
seaward of either the mean high or mean low tide line in all of the 
states surveyed herein.  Thus, these six states fail to adequately protect 
the public trust right to use the ocean by failing to protect any right to 
use the dry sand area adjacent to the foreshore.  Also, as the Raleigh 
Avenue court noted, fishermen could use the dry sand area to haul and 
dry their fishing nets under the Ancient Roman public trust doctrine, 
a predecessor of the modern doctrine.214  Likewise, under the modern 
public trust doctrine, people using the ocean should be able to use the 
dry sand area to the extent necessary for modern enjoyment of the 
ocean.215  Though the public trust doctrine may technically be limited 
to public ownership of the foreshore and the waters beyond, it is clear 
that, as the New Jersey courts have stated, any meaningful use of the 
foreshore requires at least some use of the adjacent dry sand area.216 
Third, the New Jersey version of the public trust doctrine does not 
ignore the rights of private beachfront landowners; instead, it properly 
balances these interests with those of the public.  The Matthews court 
stated in its holding that any public use of an area of upland dry sand 
is to be “subject to an accommodation of the interests of the owner.”217  
Clearly, the New Jersey doctrine does not extinguish the rights of 
private landowners.  In fact, the very existence of the Matthews factors 
demonstrates that the New Jersey approach closely considers private 
rights; if public trust rights were not balanced by private landowners’ 
rights, as they are under the Matthews factors, there would be no need 
to determine the extent of public access rights—or whether there are 
any such rights at all—on individual tracts of private beachfront land.218  
Depending on the specific application of the Matthews factors to a 
particular tract of privately owned beachfront land, an individual 
 
 212  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).  
 213  See, e.g., id.  
 214  See Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 120 (N.J. 
2005). 
 215  See id. 
 216  See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365.   
 217  See id.  
 218  See id. at 365–66; see discussion supra Part II. 
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landowner may have no obligation to allow the public onto any piece 
of his or her upland dry sand area.  Public access to the foreshore in 
New Jersey is not all-encompassing, nor does it take up all privately 
owned lands; the doctrine stops far short of this result.  Instead, the 
New Jersey doctrine provides for “reasonable access to the foreshore 
as well as a suitable area for recreation on the dry sand.”219  This 
standard is far from an indictment of the rights of private beachfront 
landowners. 
Furthermore, even if application of the Matthews factors to a 
specific tract of privately owned beachfront land dictates that the 
landowner must allow the public to access the dry sand area of the 
tract, the landowner may, depending on the circumstances, still charge 
“an appropriate fee structure for use of the beach by the public,” as 
approved by the state DEP.220  Thus, the ability of private beachfront 
landowners to charge fees for public beach access further illustrates 
that the public’s right to access does not nearly extinguish the private 
owner’s rights to his or her upland dry sand area. 
Finally, the scope of a viable modern public trust doctrine must 
encompass both modern activities and the significant modern demand 
for access to the shoreline, neither of which were contemplated by 
those who fashioned earlier iterations of the doctrine.  Modern 
demands on the seashore, which have increased as a result of societal 
changes such as improvements in transportation and significant 
population growth, have brought people to the shore in far greater 
numbers than in the past.221  Counteracting this increase in demand is 
an increase in the proportion of the shore that is privately owned, 
leading to a strain on those areas of the shore that remain publicly 
owned.222  The rights protected by the modern public trust doctrine 
thus should not be “limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation 
and fishing.”223  Instead, the doctrine should also encompass modern 
recreational beach uses in order to ensure the flexibility of the 
doctrine; modern uses that may not have been contemplated by 
previous generations should be included in the modern doctrine, as 
the New Jersey courts have recognized.224 
 
 219  Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 121. 
 220  Id. at 124.   
 221  See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 53 
(N.J. 1972).  
 222  See id. 
 223  Id. at 54.  
 224  See id. at 54–55.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The public trust doctrine is an ancient doctrine, with its earliest 
expression in ancient Rome and continued importance in the 
common law of England many centuries later.225  The individual states 
of the United States, in their adoption of the English common law, 
assumed that the doctrine was a part of state common law—including 
the doctrine’s stipulation of public ownership in tidal lands—after the 
Revolution.226  The modern public trust doctrine establishes public 
ownership of tidal lands either from the mean high tide line seaward, 
as in New Jersey, Maryland, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, 
or from the mean low tide line seaward, as in Delaware and 
Massachusetts.  Additionally, each of the seven states discussed herein 
offers the public at least some right to use the foreshore—the area of 
sometimes-dry beach sand between the mean high tide line and the 
mean low tide line—even in the two states recognizing privately owned 
foreshores.  Clearly, the public trust doctrine in each of these seven 
states purports to protect at least some degree of the public’s right to 
use the foreshore. 
But public trust rights in the foreshore carry little clout, in 
practice, without guarantees of access.  Notably, six of the states 
surveyed recognize neither a right incident to the public trust doctrine 
of vertical access from upland areas to the foreshore, nor a right 
incident to the doctrine of horizontal access above the foreshore to 
any portion of the dry sand area immediately landward of the mean 
high tide line.  As a result of these deficiencies, the public trust 
doctrine may be without substance outside of New Jersey, the only state 
surveyed that guarantees at least some degree of vertical and 
horizontal access.  Though the public may own or have a right to use 
the foreshore in each of the other six states, such ownership is of little 
use if access by land remains impossible; in lieu of a right to vertical 
access, there may be no way for the public to reach the foreshore, save 
for by boat.  Additionally, although the public supposedly has 
expansive rights to use the foreshore in some of the six states, such 
rights are of little use if the public is prohibited from using any of the 
adjacent upland dry sand area while using the foreshore. 
Thus, of the seven states surveyed in this Comment, only New 
Jersey has guaranteed that the public trust doctrine is more than just a 
 
 225  Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358–59 
(Mass. 1979). 
 226  See, e.g., Chapman v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 (Conn. 1831); Bickel v. Polk, 5 Del. (5 
Harr.) 325 (Del. Super. Ct. 1851); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821); Trustees of 
Brookhaven v. Smith, 80 N.E. 665 (N.Y. 1907); Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I. 1895). 
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legal theory.  Public ownership of the foreshore means something in 
New Jersey; public trust rights give citizens the ability to actually reach 
and to adequately use the foreshore.  Unless changes occur in the 
doctrines of the other six states, however, public trust rights to the 
foreshore in those places may be of little or no value. 
 
